Introduction
Venture capital investment is one of the most effective ways to finance newly established innovative firms, which hardly have access to other types of external investment. Practitioners and researchers suggest that venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide funds, but also exert intensive monitoring efforts and provide value-added support to projects with growth potential.
Thus, VCs differentiate themselves from traditional financiers in terms of efficiently dealing with profound information and uncertainty issues associated with the investment (Salhman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2001) . From this context emerge two questions on the role of VCs in the growth and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms: (1) Do VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of growth and innovation? (2) If so, can the performance of VCbacked firms be attributed to VCs' ability to choose better companies ex ante, or their capacity to monitor and help entrepreneurial firms to perform better after making an investment?
The impact of venture capital investment on entrepreneurial companies has attracted intensive interest from researchers in the past two decades. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that based on industry-level data, venture capital activities significantly increase the propensity to patent inventions. Similarly, based on a survey of entrepreneurial firms in Silicon Valley, Hellmann and Puri (2000) report that more innovative firms have higher chances to be selected by VCs compared to imitators. Moreover, VC-backed firms introduce new products to the market faster than non-VC-backed firms do. Hellmann and Puri (2002) also reveal that VC intervention is important in the professionalization and development of young companies, particularly in the formulation of human resource policies and adoption of strategic management decisions. Puri and Zarutskie (2012) find that VC-backed firms grow more rapidly in scale compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts. Additionally, the authors report that VC-backed Our results indicate that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in several aspects, including profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. Moreover, similar to the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2011) , we find this outperformance of VC-backed firms is caused by the project selection and ex-post monitoring efforts of VCs in China. That is, we find that VCs select firms with higher profitability, labor productivity, and sales growth, as well as firms investing more in R&D activities. Additionally, the differences are significantly magnified after VC entry, with sales growth and R&D investment as exceptions. After receiving investment from VCs, firms on average achieve higher ROS, ROE and labor productivity compared to non-VC-backed firms. No evidence, however, demonstrates that VC-backed firms experience magnified increase in terms of sales growth or R&D investment compared to non-VC-backed ones after the investment is made.
We also find that different types of VCs vary in their project screening and value-added efforts. VCs in China are divided into two distinctive groups in terms of their organizational structure. Most FVCFs are incorporated off-shore and structured as limited partnerships.
Conversely, the majority of DVCFs in China are structured as limited liability companies because limited partnership was illegal in China until June 2007. The governance of these two types of VCFs differs in a number of dimensions, such as incentive schemes, decision-making process, and compensation of investment professionals (Guo, 2008) . We find that DVCs and FVCs choose better performing entrepreneurial firms. However, only firms backed by FVCs experience statistically significant improvements in profitability, productivity, and R&D investment after the investment is made, thus suggesting that FVCs add more value than DVCs do.
Finally, we find that syndication may affect the performance of firms after the investment is made. Firms backed by syndicated VCs experience significantly magnified improvement in 5 profitability, productivity, and R&D investment after the investment is made compared to those backed by a single VC and non-VC-backed firms.
We further consider the potential identification issues. Although we empirically show that VCs invest in better performing companies, an alternative explanation is that VCs attract rather than select good firms. We address this issue by comparing the project assessment criteria identified by VCs with findings from our analysis. Consistent with our findings, interviews with 37 VCs in China suggest that the investment decision-making process is highly selective. In particular, financial performance and technological improvements are major concerns in investment decisions.
More importantly, to distinguish the ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring effects of venture investment, we use two different methods for addressing the selection and identification
concerns. First, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology to match VC-backed firms with non-VC-backed firms by industry, location, and profitability of the firms prior to receiving venture financing to reduce the potential selection. We then compare the performance and R&D activities of the sampled firms and the matched firms. However, as stated by Chemmanur et al. (2011) , the PSM approach may only deal with observable variables. VC involvement may be inflated by unobservable factors, such as market, entrepreneurial, and technological opportunities. We address this issue using two instrumental variables to identify whether the magnified performance of the VC-backed firms is driven by venture investment or certain unobservable variables. IPO is regarded as the most preferred exit approach for venture capital investment. IPO has long been highly regulated and restricted by the government in China (this topic is discussed in detail in Section 4). This exogenous factor may affect the decisions of VCs in the choice of entrepreneurial firms. We hence construct two instrumental variables to identify venture investment based on this information, namely, the number of IPO cases in Chinese stock markets, and IPO cases in both Chinese and overseas stock markets in the city where the firm is located one year before the venture investment is made. The results of the two-staged least square regressions confirm that the magnified performance improvements of VC-backed firms are indeed driven by venture investment.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the venture capital industry in China. Section 3 describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents the findings on the contributions of VCs to entrepreneurial firms, with the focus on distinguishing the effects of exante project screening and ex-post value-added efforts. Section 5 examines the value-added effects of DVCs and FVCs. Section 6 reports the findings on the value-added effects of syndicated and non-syndicated venture investment. Section 7 concludes this study.
Venture Capital Industry in China

Overview
Venture capital programs were initiated by the Chinese central government in the mid1980s as part of science and technology reform. With the transformation of China's centrally planned economy to a market-based system, the venture capital industry has experienced tremendous changes. In the first 10 years since the reform, the industry was merely a concept, with local and central governments as the major players. The first breakthrough did not occur until the late 1990s when venture fund sources were enriched. In 1996, large corporations, universities, and individuals were allowed to enter the industry for the first time. These changes not only provided entrepreneurial firms with a greater chance to access public financial markets, but also significantly enriched the divestment channels of venture investment.
These institutional changes, along with the strong economic growth of the country, attracted a wave of funds into the venture capital investment industry.
Domestic and Foreign VCFs
Currently, China is the second largest venture capital market in the world. Moreover, the venture capital market in China has attracted much interest from global players. 
Data
Data and Sample
The data used in our study are mainly obtained from China's Manufacturing Firm Survey Database (1998 Database ( -2007 , which is published annually by the National Bureau To compare VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms in terms of performance and R&D activities, we construct a control group for comparison purposes. We build the control group in several steps to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific matching method. First, we select all non-VC-backed firms from China's Manufacturing Firm Survey Database. We then match the VC-backed firms with non-VC-backed firms by industry (at the three-digit SIC level)
and location (at the provincial level). Finally, we employ the methodology of randomly drawing one-to-five matched pairs to build the control group. To ensure that our control group is representative, we repeat this random draw methodology 15 times, and the results are consistent. including telecommunication and computer products, electronic and electrical equipment, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, machinery and equipment products, and instrumentrelated products. Firms in these industries comprise 60% of the total sampled VC-backed firms.
This figure is consistent with the industry distribution of VC-backed firms reported by Zero2IPO
( [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The distribution of the sampled VC-backed firms suggests that our samples fairly represent the entire sample of VC-backed firms.
Variables
The performance and R&D activities of firms are our major interests in this study. We estimate the performance and R&D activities in different dimensions, namely, profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. Profitability is measured by return on sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE) of the firm. Labor Productivity is measured by net profit per employee of the firm. Sales Growth is the annual sales growth of the firm. We use R&D Ratio to measure the R&D activities of a firm. This variable is R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm.
We are interested in the changes in performance and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms in relation to venture capital investment within the examination period. Hence, we need a variable to distinguish whether the firm is backed by VCs. The VC Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by VCs, and equal to 0 if otherwise. A significantly positive coefficient on this variable implies that VC-backed firms generally have higher efficiency. Second, the VC Entry dummy variable is used to divide the entire examination period into two parts, namely, the period before and after venture investment. VC Entry is equal to 0 for the period before the investment is made, and is equal to 1 for the period after the investment is made. The value of this variable for the firms in the control group is determined by its pair in the VC-backed group.
We use this variable to test the structural change effect before and after the infusion of venture capital investment. Finally, we include an interaction term of VC Dummy and VC Entry in our regression to test whether the performance increase after VC entry is the same for VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. The interaction term VC Post is equal to 1 if the observation is for a VC-backed firm in the period after the investment is made, and equal to 0 if otherwise.
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We are also interested in how the different types of VCs add value to their portfolio firms.
As previously mentioned, domestic and foreign VCFs differ in several aspects mainly due to the regulatory restrictions in China. (Titman, 1984; Pfeffer, 1996) . We therefore control for this effect when we examine the post-investment performance and R&D investment dynamics of firms. Table 3 reports the t-test results on the differences in profitability, sales growth, productivity, and R&D input between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. We compare the two groups of firms from the onset of VC investment to two years later. First, in the year of VC entry, VC-backed firms have statistically better profitability than non-VC-backed firms. VCbacked firms have twice as much ROS and about 1.22 times as much ROE as non-VC-backed firms. Second, VC-backed firms have higher labor productivity. The net profit per employee of VC-backed firms is about 2.3 times larger than that of non-VC-backed firms. Third, VC-backed firms enjoy 2.8 times higher sales growth than that of non-VC-backed firms at the time of the investment. Fourth, VC-backed firms invest three times more in R&D activities than non-VCbacked ones at the time of VC entry. More importantly, all the observed differences in ROS, ROE, labor productivity, and R&D ratio persist for at least two years after VC entry, and these differences increase with time. However, the sales growth of the firms seems to be more fluctuated over the years.
Summary Statistics
To ensure that our results are not affected by outliers, we apply the Wilcoxon test on the median. We use the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test to determine whether or not the performance difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms from the onset of venture investment stay after two year of the investment (Kazmier and Pohl, 1984) . Table 3 indicates that our results are robust to outliers.
Findings on the contribution of VCs to entrepreneurial firms
Do VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms?
Our first question is whether VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms. Table 4 shows the regressions that compare the ROS, ROE, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. As shown in Models 1 and 2, VC Dummy is significantly positive, implying that VC-backed firms outperform their non-VC-backed counterparts in terms of profitability. On average, the ROS and ROE of VC-backed firms are higher than that of non-VC-backed firms by 0.03 and 0.05, respectively, which is roughly 30% of the average value of ROS and 20% of the average value of ROE of VC-backed firms at the time of the investment. Model 3 demonstrates the regression results on sales growth. On average, the sales growth of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms by 0.2, which is over 60% of the average growth rate of VC-backed firms at the time of the venture investment.
Model 4 reports the labor productivity of the firms. The results are similar to those we find on profitability. VC-backed firms generally have higher labor productivity than non-VC-backed ones. On average, the net profit over the number of employees of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms by 28.29, which is roughly 38% of the average labor productivity of VC-backed firms at the time of the venture investment. Model 5 shows the R&D expenditure over total sales. VC Dummy is significantly and positively correlated with R&D expenditure, which suggests that VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities compared to their non-VCbacked counterparts. On average, VC-backed firms invest approximately 0.8% more of their total sales in R&D activities. To ensure the reliability of our results, we repeat the above estimates using the other 14 control groups matched by industry and location of the firms. The 16 findings remain robust. 10 To summarize, similar to the findings in developed economies, VCbacked firms in China outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of profitability, labor productivity, and sales growth. The same outcome is observed in the case of R&D investment.
VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities than non-VC-backed firms do.
Do VCs select better performing firms?
We conduct logit regressions, a set of cross-sectional data analyses on the firm's performance and R&D activities in the year before the VC investment is made, to determine whether VCs choose to invest in better performing firms. The dependent variable is VC Dummy. Table 5 presents the logit regression results. In Models 1 to 5, we separately put the performance variables into the estimates. The ROE, ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment of the firms are all significantly and positively correlated with VC Dummy. The results suggest that firms are more likely to be backed by VCs if they have higher profitability, growth rate, and labor productivity. Additionally, firms investing more in R&D activities seem to have a higher probability to gain venture investment. In Model 6, we put all the performance variables together into the regression estimate. Specifically, an increase in the ROS of the firm by 0.1 from its mean (about 100% of its mean) increases its probability of being selected by VCs by 4%, and an increase in the ROE of the firm by 0.2 from its mean (about 100% of its mean) increases its probability of being selected by VCs by 2%. Similarly, an increase in the net profit per employee of the firm by 75 from its mean (100% of its mean) increases its probability of being backed by VCs by 7.5%. Model 7 reports the relationship between R&D investment and the chance of being backed by VCs. Data on R&D expenditure are available only after 2005; thus, the number of observations decreases from 929 to 709 when we incorporate R&D into our regression analysis. R&D ratio is shown to be significantly and positively correlated with VC Dummy, which suggests that firms investing more in R&D activities may be more attractive to
VCs. An increase in the R&D investment of the firm by 0.01 from its mean (100% of its mean) increases its probability of being selected by VCs by 2.6%.
We also control for the leverage ratio, The interviews also reveal that VCs consider the financial performance and technological improvements of entrepreneurial projects as important aspects when making investment decisions. As shown in Table A -2, 18 out of the 38 criteria are related to the product, market, and financial aspects of entrepreneurial firms. We also ask VCs to list 10 essential criteria without which they will definitely reject projects regardless of other aspects. As shown in Table A-3, half of the 10 essential criteria are related to the market, product, and financial outlook of projects.
ROS, labor productivity, and R&D investment are factors that reflect not only the financial situation of firms, but also their market penetration situation and strategies for technological improvements. Furthermore, these factors indirectly reflect the capability of entrepreneurs and management teams. Although several important factors, such as the personality of entrepreneurs and the features of management teams, are excluded from our regression analysis, our estimates cover important elements affecting ex-ante project selection by VCs.
The interviews suggest that VCs exert much effort in ex-ante project selection, and the selection criteria are consistent with the aspects we find in our regression analysis. However, we do not seek to claim that the ex-ante project selection process is the sole explanation for the results of our statistical examinations. Rather, we suggest that these supportive findings from the interviews help us to identify the mechanisms underlying our regression estimates.
In sum, companies with better financial performance and higher sales growth and labor productivity have a higher probability of being funded by VCs in China. In addition, companies 19 investing more in R&D activities have more chances to be financed by VCs. These findings are consistent with studies conducted in the context of developed economies (MacMillan et al., 1985; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Chemmanur et al., 2011) . Our results also suggest that traditional finance theories do not always apply to venture capital investment. For instance, no evidence shows that leverage ratio, which is typically considered by banks when making investment decisions, has negative effects on being selected by VCs.
Do VCs add value?
Propensity score matching
The results from the previous subsections confirm that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms, and part of the outperformance comes from VC selection efforts. In this subsection, we examine whether the post-investment monitoring and support efforts of VCs add value to their portfolio companies. Specifically, we focus on the difference-in-difference estimates of performance and R&D investment of the VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.
As shown in Section 4.2, VCs select firms that perform better and invest more in R&D activities. To capture the difference-in-difference effects, we need to initially control for the selection biases. We construct a new control group of non-VC-backed firms using the PSM methodology, in which we match firms with different dimensions (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Chemmanur et al., 2011) . We particularly require the matched firm to be in the same industry (at the three-digit level), the same location, and have a similar level of profitability measured by ROE in the year before the firm is backed by VC investment. We use one to five pairs for matching. Both t-test (t-statistics = 0.102) and two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z-statistics = 0.662) show that after the matching, no statistically significant difference in profitability is observed between the two groups of firms.
Based on this control group matched by propensity scores, we estimate the value-added effects of venture investment. To capture the evolution of firm operations and identify whether firms show improved performance and R&D activities after the venture capital investment is made, we add VC Dummy, VC Entry, and VC Post to the estimates. VC Post, the interaction term of the treatment effects of venture investment (VC Dummy) and before and after effects (VC 20 Entry), is our major interest as we aim to the estimate the difference-in-difference effects of venture investment on performance and R&D activities of the firm. A significantly positive coefficient of VC Post indicates that the increase in pre-and post-investment performance is larger for VC-backed firms than for non-VC-backed firms. Table 6 Model 4 demonstrates the regression for labor productivity of the firm. Similar to the results on profitability, we find a significant and positive relationship between VC Post and the labor productivity of the firm. On average, compared to non-VC-backed firms, VC-backed firms enjoy further increase in labor productivity by 17.17 after the investment is made, which is roughly 23% of the average labor productivity of the VC-backed firms at the time of the investment. These findings suggest that the gap in profitability and labor productivity between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms is further widened after the venture capital investment is made.
Finally, Model 5 reports the R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. VC Dummy is observed to be statistically and positively correlated with the R&D investment of the firm, although no statistically significant relationship is found between R&D investment and VC Post.
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The result suggests that VC-backed firms invest more in R&D activities compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts. However, VC involvements do not seem to further magnify the gap in R&D investment between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms.
In sum, the above estimates suggest that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. However, the value-added effect is mainly observed in profitability and labor productivity; that is, the difference between VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms is significantly magnified after the venture capital investment is made. No evidence demonstrates that VCs add significant value in terms of sales growth or R&D investment of the firm. Overall, our results are similar to Chemmanur et al. (2011), who report that the TFP of the VC-backed firms is significantly improved compared to non-VC-backed firms in the United States after controlling the selection factors. However, our results differ from the findings of Puri and Zarutskie (2012), which suggest that the sales growth of VC-backed firms is higher than that of non-VC-backed firms, whereas the profitability of VC-backed firms is lower than that of non-VC-backed firms.
Identification issues on the value-added effects of VCs
The estimates in the previous subsection not only show a strong and positive relationship between venture investment and firm performance and R&D investment, but also suggest that the extent of the positive effect of venture capital investment is further increased for profitability and labor productivity after the investment is made. Although the PSM methodology helps us to control the selection issues, it has certain limitations; that is, it is incapable of capturing the effects of unobservable variables. Several missing variables, not VC involvement, may contribute to improved performance after the venture capital investment is made. For instance, VCs choose to invest in better performing companies ex ante. These better performing companies selected by VCs may have better chances of seizing several external opportunities compared to non-VC-backed firms; thus, they grow at an improved pace after the venture capital investment is made. In this case, the value-added effects of venture investment we find in Table   6 may be inflated.
To address the above identification concern with unobservable variables, we employ the two-staged Heckman estimation procedure for identifying the value-added effects of venture 22 investment. We particularly employ two instrumental variables to separately predict the probability of the firm being backed by venture investment in the first stage estimation. The first instrumental variable is IPO_CN, which refers to the number of IPOs in the Chinese stock markets from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment is made. The second instrumental variable is IPO_All, which refers to the total number of IPOs in the Chinese and overseas stock markets 11 from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment is made.
We choose these two instrumental variables because they are correlated with the demand and supply of venture capital investment in the city, but are independent of the performance of VC-backed firms. The institutions in China determine the number of IPO cases across regions.
The probability of a firm going IPO may predict whether a firm may be selected by VCs. IPO is evidently the most successful exit approach for venture capital investment. The IPO of portfolio firms provides VCs with the highest financial returns compared to other divestment approaches, and brings good reputation to VCs (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Chemmanur et al., 2011). Thus, the higher the chance of the firm to be listed soon, the more attractive the firm becomes to VCs.
However, the equity share issuance of firms has been heavily governed and influenced by the central government in China. Under a quota system, the central government determines the total number of shares to be issued in the country, and then allocates stock issuance quotas to regions and ministries. Regional governments, in turn, allocate quotas to selected companies for going public through IPOs. Studies indicate that even after 2003 when the quota system was abandoned, the issuance of public offering continued to be tightly controlled by the central government (i.e., CSEC); thus, the number of annual IPO cases indicated the ease of obtaining IPO approval from the government for the following year (Du and Xu, 2009 Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the second stage regressions. Models 1 to 5 of
Panel B report the second stage regressions, in which VC Dummy is instrumented by IPO_CN.
The instrumented VC Dummy is significantly and positively correlated with all the performance measurements and R&D investment of the firm. Moreover, VC Post is significantly and positively correlated with ROS, ROE, and labor productivity. These results are consistent with the results shown in Table 6 , which suggest that the differences of the firms in terms of profitability and productivity are magnified after the venture capital investment is made.
However, different from the results in Table 6, The only difference is that the relationship between VC Post and ROS becomes statistically insignificant.
In sum, using the two-staged Heckman estimation enables us to identify the probability of a firm being selected by venture capital investment. The results of the two-staged least square regressions confirm the value-added effects of VCs on the profitability and labor productivity of firms.
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Do different types of VCs add different values?
In this section, we determine whether different types of VCs vary in their effects on the performance and R&D activities of the firms they invest in. As previously mentioned, the foundation of the value-added effect argument is that VCs exert effort to monitor and support their portfolio companies after the capital investment is made. This argument suggests two major requirements that enable VCs to add value to their entrepreneurial companies, namely, expertise to provide helpful suggestions and efficiently monitor operations, and motivation to exert effort 
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In contrast, most foreign VCs have investment banking or entrepreneurial experience that is closely related to private equity financing. Learning curve theory suggests that more experience and accumulated knowledge reduce costs and improve efficiency (Spence, 1981; Ghemawat and Spence, 1985) . We therefore suggest that foreign VCs have more expertise in monitoring and providing support to their portfolio companies compared to domestic VCs. suggest that DVC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms. However, the outperformance of the DVC-backed firms seems to be mainly explained by the ex-ante selection efforts of DVCs, but not their ex-post value-added efforts. As a comparison, the outperformance of the FVCbacked firms seems to come from both the ex-ante selection and the ex-post value-added efforts.
Model 3 of Table 8 reports the regression for the sales growth of the firm. DVC Dummy and FVC Dummy are significantly and positively correlated with the sales growth of the firm.
However, no statistically significant relationship is observed between FVC Post and sales growth.
Furthermore, DVC Post is even significantly and negatively correlated with sales growth. The results suggest that although both DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms enjoy higher sales growth rate, the effects are mainly contributed by the ex-ante selection efforts of VCs.
We examine the labor productivity of the firms in Model 4 of Table 8 . DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms enjoy significantly higher labor productivity than non-VC-backed firms.
Moreover, after receiving the venture investment, DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms enjoy a magnified improvement in labor productivity compared to non-VC-backed firms. The results suggest that both DVCs and FVCs select firms with higher labor productivity to invest in. At the same time, both types of VCs help their portfolio firms to further improve the labor productivity after the investments are made.
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Lastly, we explore the R&D investment of the firms backed by different VCs. As Model 5 of Table 8 shows, DVC Dummy and FVC Dummy are significantly and positively correlated with the R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. However, no statistically significant relationship is observed between DVC Post and R&D investment. We find a significant and positive relationship between FVC Post and R&D investment. These results indicate that DVCs typically choose firms that invest more in R&D activities, while they do not seem to push the firms to further intensify their R&D efforts after the investment is made. Conversely, FVCbacked firms not only invest more in R&D activities, but also significantly intensify R&D investment after the investment is made compared to the firms in the control group.
The above examinations support our assumptions on the relationship between the experience and incentives of VCs and the performance of their portfolio companies. Primarily, both DVC-backed and FVC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of profitability, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment. However, the effect for DVC-backed firms mainly comes from ex-ante project selection. In other words, domestic VCs mainly select companies with higher profitability, higher labor productivity, higher sales growth, and a higher degree of R&D intensity, while they do not seem to add value after the investment is made, with labor productivity as the only exception. Compared to DVCs in China, FVCs have more experienced investment experts and provide high-powered incentives to investment professionals, thus adding more value to their portfolio companies after the investment is made.
This result is consistent with the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2011) that VCs may be heterogeneous in their capability to add value to their portfolio companies after the investment is made.
Does syndicated investment add more value to firms?
In this section, we examine the impact of the investment approach on the value-added effects of VCs on the performance and R&D activities of firms, with the focus on syndicated investment. Syndication is one of the most potent investment approaches in venture investment.
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Theoretical studies suggest that venture capitalists may share information and expertise to gain more access to potential deals, improve ex-ante decision making, provide more value-added assistance to entrepreneurs, and increase capability in monitoring portfolios by syndicating (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007; Cestone et al., 2006) . Another argument is that syndication of venture investment is mainly for window dressing purposes; that is, syndication is a mechanism through which VCs collude to overstate their past performance to potential investors.
Empirical studies support the arguments by demonstrating that syndicated deals have higher returns (Brander et al., 2002) and are more likely to have an exit approach and achieve higher IPO valuations (Chemmanur and Tian, 2009; Tian, 2011) . All the existing empirical studies focus on the effects of syndication on VC returns, which are typically measured by the exit rate, exit channel, and exit value. However, to our knowledge, how syndication affects the performance and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms based on firm-level data has not been estimated so far. Thus, we extend the extant studies by examining the value-added effects of syndicated investment.
To capture the syndication effects on the performance and R&D investment of the firm, we include Syndication and Non Syndication into the regressions to distinguish syndicated VCbacked firms, non-syndicated VC-backed firms and non-VC-backed firms. We also include VC Entry and the interaction terms of VC Entry with Syndication and Non Syndication respectively to estimate the dynamics of the syndication effects. Table 9 reports the results on the effects of syndication. Syndication and Non-Syndication are significantly and positively correlated with the ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. This finding suggests that whether or not the investment is syndicated, VC-backed firms have higher ROS, labor productivity, sales growth, and R&D investment compared to non-VC-backed firms. We then examine the value-added effects of the two different types of investment by adding Syndication Post and Non-Syndication Post, the interaction terms between VC Entry and Syndication and Non-Syndication respectively, to the estimates. Syndication Post is found to be statistically and significantly correlated with all the performance and R&D variables, except sales growth. However, no statistically significant relationship is observed between any performance or R&D variables and Non-Syndication Post.
The results imply that the ex-ante screening efforts rather than the ex-post value-added efforts of
VCs contribute more to the outperformance of the firms backed by non-syndicated investment.
Firms backed by syndicated investment, however, experience magnified improvements in financial performance, labor productivity, and R&D investment compared to their non-VC-28 backed counterparts. The empirical findings confirm the theoretical arguments that syndication may better facilitate VCs to monitor and provide more value-added assistance to entrepreneurial firms.
Conclusion
This paper examines the contribution of venture capital investment to the performance and R&D activities of entrepreneurial firms in China. Based on the results of firm-level panel data analysis, we find that VCs contribute to entrepreneurial firms in China in two ways. First, VCs in China select firms that have better financial performance and higher investment in R&D activities. Second, VC-backed firms experience magnified improvement in performance after the venture capital investment is made. We use the PSM methodology to distinguish the effects of the ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring/support efforts of VCs. At the same time, we use the two-staged Heckman estimation to address identification issues; the results remain robust.
These findings suggest that VCs operating in China function similarly to those in developed economies; that is, they not only choose to fund better performing firms, but also add value to these firms after the investment is made. Furthermore, we find that the value-added effects of VCs are heterogeneous depending on the different types of VCs and varied investment approaches. FVCs not only select better performing firms to invest in, but also add significant value to these firms after the investment is made in China. However, no evidence demonstrates that firms backed by DVCs experience significant performance improvements after the investment is made. Lastly, firms backed by syndicated investment gain significantly magnified performance improvement compared to their non-VC-backed counterparts, whereas firms backed by non-syndicated investment do not.
This study contributes to the literature on venture capital investment in three aspects. 
Appendix. Interview Data
We conducted interviews with VCs in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen between 2005 and 2006. The interviews focused on exploring the management of VCFs and VC investment activities in China, including ex-ante project selection, due diligence process, contract design, and postinvestment monitoring activities. Convenience and snowball sampling strategies were adopted for the interviews. We tried to contact VCs that are very active in China's market. In total, 37 VCs from 34 VCFs were interviewed. Among the 37 VCs, 24 are from 22 FVCFs and 13 are from 12 DVCFs (Table A- Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. All observations are at the firm-year level. * * * , * * , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Statistical significance for differences of means and medians differences correspond to t-tests and rank-sum tests, respectively.
Table 4 The Performance and R&D of VC-backed Firms and Non-VC-backed Firms
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (one to five pairs matched by location and industry of the firm). The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales. Independent variables include VC Dummy, a dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is backed by venture investment and zero if otherwise. Control variables include employee treatment, which is measured by the average salary of the employees; Leverage, which is measured by the total debts over total assets; State Ownership, which is measured by the total state shareholding over total equity; firm size, which is measured by the total number of employees; and firm age, which is the age of the firm.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The key independent variables are: IPO_CN, which refers to the number of IPOs in Chinese stock markets from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment is made; and, IPO_All, which refers to the total number of IPOs in Chinese and overseas stock markets from the city where the firm is located one year before the investment is made. Panel B shows the second-stage estimates where the dependent variables are ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales of the firm. The key independent variables are VC Dummy instrumented by IPO_CN and IPO_All respectively. All control variables are the same to those of Table 4 .
Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 8 Changes of Performance and R&D of Firms and the Types of VCFs
This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of FVC-backed, DVC-backed and Non-VC-backed Firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (1-5 pairs) matched by PSM. We use location, industry and ROE as the main matching criteria. The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales. Independent variables include DVC Dummy, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by domestic VCs and is equal to 0 if otherwise; FVC Dummy, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by foreign VCs and is equal to 0 if otherwise; VC Entry, a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for the period before the investment is made and is equal to 1 for the period after the investment is made; DVC Post, which is an interaction term of DVC Dummy and VC Entry; FVC Post, which is an interaction term of FVC Dummy and VC Entry. All control variables are the same to those of Table 4 .
(1) This is a series of random effect panel regressions for the profitability, sales growth, labor productivity and R&D of firms backed by syndicated venture investment, non-syndicated investment and non-VC backed firms. The observations are firm-year units of the sampled 258 VC-backed firms and their non-VC-backed counterparts (1-5 pairs) matched by PSM. We use location, industry and ROE as the main matching criteria. The dependent variables include ROS, ROE, Sales Growth, Labor Productivity and R&D expenditure over total sales. Independent variables include Syndication, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed by syndicated venture investment and is equal to 0 if otherwise; Non-Syndication, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is backed non-syndicated venture investment and is equal to 0 if otherwise; VC Entry, a dummy variable that is equal to 0 for the period before the investment is made and is equal to 1 for the period after the investment is made; Syn-Post Post, which is an interaction term of Syndication and VC Entry; Non-Syn-Post, which is an interaction term of Non-Syndication and VC Entry. All control variables are the same to those of Table 4 .
(1) 
